In the current controversial context caused by the disclosure of classified details of several top-secret United States and British government mass surveillance programs to the press by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden, issues of data privacy, anonymity, unlinkability, forward secrecy and deniability have raised to public prominence. In this work we investigate how an alternate usage of stateof-the-art yet ubiquitous computing platforms might help sovereign, citizen and general public recovery of control over privacy. These goals are notoriously difficult to achieve on the Internet today due to the insufficient public-key infrastructure at the user level. Our approach leverages modern multi-core processors and general-purpose computing on graphics processing units, both as a source of true random entropy pools and computational engines for very fast elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). Such autonomous, highfrequency Diffie-Hellman-ready agents reside in a breadth of devices ranging from smartphones and tablets, to laptops and high-end servers in datacenters. In contrast to the current circumstance, this suggested infrastructure enables generalized symmetric exchanges with the Vernam cipher without compromising ease-of-use nor requiring revolutionary changes in today's well-grounded ECC theory.
Introduction

Motivations
Recent systemic studies of trust with asymmetric cryptography usage led to questioning the assumption that sufficient randomness is indeed available each time public keys are generated [19] . The issue of the quality of random bits used in key generation and the depth of the required entropy pools is of course a major question raised in these studies. The extent to which public keys are in fact shared among unrelated parties also points to the need for fast, low-cost, readily available, autonomous key generation and encryption-decryption capability.
The current state-of-the-art revolves around practical approximations of a truly random number generator. Most previous software algorithms for generating unpredictable random number sequences rely on entropy gathering from measuring unpredictable external events. Unfortunately the actual throughput of these generators are in the range of 10-1,000 bits per second, which limits their use to simple seeds for pseudo-random generators.
On the other hand, if authentication is one of the core security properties that many cryptographic protocols aim to provide, the "post-Snowden Era" put a new emphasis on the opposite property, anonymity, and specifically in censorship circumvention scenarios. In practice, however, the seemingly contradictory properties of authentication and anonymity are complementary in the day-to-day business of citizens and sovereign states. Confronting the scope and breadth of the New Surveillance dramatized by the Snowden's papers calls for re-thinking a systemic user-level infrastructure where high-speed, high-quality entropy pools serve autonomous secret generation and instant, secure data sharing with forward secrecy.
In this paper, we investigate the feasibility of such an alternative infrastructure enabling generalized symmetric key cryptography at the user level, from the technical and economical perspectives. Grounded on well-proven ECC, our approach enables the massive deployment of very fast, autonomous, Diffie-Hellman-capable agents on popular devices such as smartphones, tablets and laptops as well as in high-end datacenters. The view is to make the Vernam cipher, or one-time pad, a readily available, on-demand communication channel without compromising ease-of-use, in sovereign and citizen usage scenarios.
In order to do so, we leverage the ubiquitous multicores and GPUs into instruments for users to reclaim control over their data privacy. For proper cryptographic application of these parallel architectures, an obvious requirement is that all secrets should stay on and all cryptographic processing should run on the GPU itself. The technical challenge then turns into running the GPU both as an entropy pool for high quality random bit generation and as a computing platform for accelerating common cryptographic functions.
Contribution
In this contribution then, we focus on the efficient realization of the computationally expensive operations in ECC cryptosystems on off-the-shelf GPUs. More precisely, we present improved and novel implementations employing GPUs both as entropy pool and accelerator for ECC-based DiffieHellman key exchange [7] in a complete three-tiered architecture. The latter basically consists in three functional layers: (1) a non-deterministic random bits generator (TRBG); (2) a parallelized, efficient implementation of modular arithmetic on big integers; and (3) an application layer offering a simple API for ECC scalar multiplication and Vernam cipher encryption/decryption.
The novelty of the proposed architecture resides in the dual use of mass-marketed, low-cost hardware as a deep entropy pool for an innovative TRBG in a tight integration with onboard, efficiently parallelized cryptographic libraries for a variety of applications. The architecture delivers high speed, high quality secrets on a broad set of computing devices. The paper concludes with an overview of some user controlled data privacy applications supported by this platform.
Related work
GPU platforms serve varied purposes, all with different architectural characteristics and performance capabilities. In addition, the rapid pace of manufacturers' progress may render experimental results obsolete quite quickly.
A reference work on cryptographic quality random number generation is HAVEGE [26] which focused on general purpose CPUs in modern architectures and operating systems. Beyond its original implementations at IRISA, HAVEGE has also been implemented in popular libraries such as PolarSSL [24] .
In [13] a mixed CUDA/PTX assembler implementation on the high-range Nvidia's GeForce GTX 580 is evaluated against a highly optimized MPIR 2.5.0 bignum library on an Intel i7 processor. The evaluation shows 10 5 to 250 modular exponentiation per second when the exponent size varies from 512 bits to 4,096 bits, a speedup of 13× to 3× over an OpenMP CPU implementation. In [28] different approaches are proposed and compared to compute asymmetric cryptography (RSA and Elliptic Curve) on Nvidia's GeForce 8800 GTS. The authors show 194 to 419 1,024-bit modular exponentiation per second, and 28 to 56 2,048-bit modular exponentiation per second.
The PACE library on the Nvidia's GeForce 9800 GX2-with 2 on-board GPUs-is evaluated in [11] . Experimental results show 45 160-bit modular multiplications per millisecond down to 4 384-bit modular multiplications per millisecond. In [12] the authors devote a sizeable portion of their paper to modular multiplication. They implement Montgomery multiplication in radix representation with the pencil-and-paper algorithm. It is configured so that a single exponent encompasses a CUDA warp (32-threads) in order to maximize thread utilization. Messages are split between two warps dealing with modulus p and q respectively. Certain algorithmic optimizations, however, such as squaring and modulo multiplication could not be implemented in this parallel implementation.
Since its introduction by Bernstein, Curve25519 [5] has been widely studied and implemented many times on diverse hardware architectures [6, 17] with many different cryptographic applications.
GPU hardware as an ubiquitous, deep entropy pool
A typical GPU architecture [25] consists of several general purpose scalar processors grouped in multiprocessor cores with a hierarchy of global, local and resident (cache) memory allowing several levels of data and computation parallelism. It is becoming increasing common to use a GPU as a modified form of stream processor. This idea turns the massive computational power of a modern graphics accelerator's shader pipeline into general-purpose computing power, as opposed to being hard-wired solely to do graphical operations.
On the other hand, today's low cost, mass production of GPUs make them ubiquitous, not only on PCs, but on broadly released devices such as laptops, smartphones and tablets as well as in special architectures for high-performance computing, with an increasing performance-price ratio every year.
Modern GPUs feature a large number of hardware mechanisms which aim at improving performance: hundreds of cores per streaming multiprocessors, warp and block schedulers, L1, L2 caches and memory partitioning, thread execution predication, specific memory transfer... While the actual results of GPU-bound computations do not depend on the state of these components, this state is however very volatile and cannot be monitored by the user.
The first layer of the architecture proposed here turns the GPU into an efficient random bit generator (RBG) hardware. It runs a user-level software unpredictable random number generator for GPUs and multicores that exploits these modifications of the internal volatile hardware states as a source of volume entropy. In compliance with standards, e.g. FIPS 140-2 [4, 8] , a specifically designed program operates on selected physical parameters of the GPU, used here as a non-deterministic or true RBG, to produce an output dependent on an unpredictable (hardware) source that is "outside human control". The unpredictable stream of bits is then seeded as an unguessable input key to an approved deterministic RBG (DRBG or pseudo-RNG). The collection of entropy (TRBG) and the DRBG are both implemented as GPU-bound programs, known as kernels. Hundreds of millions of unpredictable bits can be gathered per kernel call.
In contrast to the current view that the task of a DRBG [3, 27] is simply to distil out sufficient entropy for all outputs and queue it up for use-shutting down completely or generating predictable pseudo-random output when it does not see enough entropy-this innovative use of GPU hardware ensures that sufficient entropy is continuously collected for the production of unguessable keys.
Parallel heterogeneous cryptographic computing
ECC [16, 23] cryptographic computations generally use somewhat smaller key sizes than RSA [9] to provide comparable security levels. Nonetheless elliptic curve scalar multiplications (addition and doubling) remain costly. In addition to the difficulty of computing modular arithmetic operations on bignums, the algorithms traditionally used in cryptography [22] do not easily translate to efficient implementation on highly parallel architectures. Multiplication and exponentiation by bignums, in particular, are most demanding. These basic operations are conducted stepwise, in several bignum parsing phases, inducing complex and heavy data dependencies between steps. In order to overcome these data dependency obstacles, the proposed kernels rely on the residue number system (RNS) representation of scalars and elliptic curves point coordinates which reduces bignum operations to easily parallelized small modulus (32-bit or 64-bit) arithmetic computations.
RNS for efficient modular arithmetic
The principle of the RNS is to consider several moduli m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m n that contain no common factors-they are coprimes to each other-and to work indirectly with residues of bignums modulo each m i rather than directly with the bignum itself. Hence, in the RNS, a bignum X is represented by (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) , the list of its residues x i = X mod m i on a selected base of coprimes. The fact that this representation is unique, provided X < M = m i , is the Chinese Remainders Theorem [15] . In this convenient representation, addition, subtraction and multiplication on bignums are performed in parallel modulo each m i . These independent streams of computation, or channels, are directly mapped onto threads on the GPU computing platform.
Conversions from binary to the RNS are executed by reduction to the residues x i on each channel, which requires only small integer operations. The opposite conversion, from the RNS to binary, however, is more involved. Two major methods are available: translating first to an intermediary mixed radix system (MRS), which although sequential in nature may be computed separately on each channel [15] ; or using the Chinese Remainders Theorem which lends itself to proper parallelization provided extra care in the implementation of coprimes base conversions [14] .
ECC arithmetic requires modular operations, namely multiplication and exponentiation, to be performed efficiently. Our kernels rely on Montgomery modular multiplication [1] . This method simultaneously performs multiplication and reduction by a (bignum) modulus N , in a so-called Montgomery domain characterized by a large integer R. Bignum operands X, Y are replaced byX = X R,Ỹ = Y R and the Montgomery modular multiplication computesZ = XỸ R −1 mod N , provided again that N < R. By choosing R = M = m i , single steps are performed independently on each RNS channel. Because translating bignums to and from the Montgomery domain is costly, as many operations as possible are performed in the Montgomery domain. Such is the case for scalar multiplication and addition of elliptic curves points, where careful choice of coprimes bases for the RNS [2] and pre-computations help moving many modular multiplications outside the main scalar multiplication loop [10] thus improving overall performance.
In the current implementation Curve25519 arithmetic uses coprimes bases of 10 32-bit integers. This generic implementation scales up to elliptic curves on larger fields such as NIST p521r1 [9] and Brainpool brainpoolP512r1 [20] , which simply requires larger coprimes bases of 16 32-bit integers.
Efficient ECCDH with Curve25519
Following the lines of [5] we chose Curve25519 as a reference high speed ECCDH implementation with backup ellip-tic curves from [20] as alternatives for different applications. Curve25519 provide extremely high speed, and more so in a batch parallelized implementation, no time variability, protecting against timing attacks, short secret and public keys, 32 bytes, and compact kernels that run on small to high range GPU boards and multicore processors.
Our API is geared towards ubiquitous, on-demand usage of the Diffie-Hellman protocol for peer-to-peer and client to server communication in various security settings. Moreover, the high quality and non-deterministic nature of the TRNG combined with the high speed of the ECC calculations afforded by the GPU architecture provide opportunity for a systemic change of perspective on current traditional and well-proven security protocols. Revisiting familiar protocols with the fresh view of making every Diffie-Hellman shared secret ephemeral and their generation, in large volumes, costless for all practical purposes may yield new insights in addressing issues mentioned in the Sect. 1.
For instance, an immediate application of the key generation, encryption, and decryption API based on our architecture would be an instant messaging application based on the Vernam cipher where the message streams are bitwise exclusive-ored with a true random bits stream shared by sender and recipient. The shared secret stream is simply the result of continuous high speed Diffie-Hellman agreement on entropy generated autonomously, in volume, by both sender and recipient on their GPU-capable devices.
Evaluation
Uniformly distributed random numbers generation
TestU01 [18] is generally recognized as providing the most complete battery of statistical tests for random number generators. We submitted the GPU-based TRBG to the so-called "Big Crush" battery, a suite of 106 very stringent statistical tests, in the 1.2.1 version of TestU01. As comparison points we reproduce results of McCullough's review of TestU01 [21] along ours. The test file was generated on Nvidia's GPU GeForce GTX 275. In addition, a self-validating kernel was developed to further qualify the TRBG. The kernel streamlines FIPS [8] basic tests right after the generation on the GPU as a form of simplified health test of the generator. As GPUs provide a very high degree of parallelism, the TRBG delivers very high-throughput unpredictable streams, in the range of 32-40 GB/s of seed bits, depending on the GPU board. This high performance level doubles up the GPU-based TRBG usage as a complementary deep entropy pool source for traditional CPU-based DRBGs used in popular cryptographic libraries such as OpenSSL or PolarSSL (Table 1) . (Table 2) .
In an experiment series, we focused on Curve25519 where key size is 256 bits. Encryption and decryption in the Vernam cipher is an exclusive or of the message stream which is performed on the GPU in time negligible compared to key and shared secret generation (scalar multiplications) ( Table 3) . Best performance of the OpenCL kernels only are reported in the tables. All low to mid-range GPUs geared at laptops show execution times in the 2,500 to 10,000 scalar multiplications per second range, which are comparable if slightly better than recent results reported in [29] . On the high-end GPUs, record speeds enable encryption and decryption with one-time secrets on high bandwidth transport layers, with applications to Voice over IP and video (Table 2) .
In another series of experiments we compared batch mode and RNS implementations across different elliptic curves with higher key sizes providing stronger security levels (Table 4) .
Best performance results of OpenCL kernels running on GPU and on multicore CPU are reported here. Note that the generic implementations are unsurprisingly an order of magnitude slower than the optimized implementations available for Curve25519. While RNS match batch performance on 256-bit key sizes, it becomes more interesting for elliptic curves over finite fields with larger moduli.
These results point to the feasibility of a complete trust architecture based on GPU entropy and parallel computation. Furthermore the readily available GPU and multicore CPU at a low price point in a wide variety of devices, equipped with high-speed streaming of on-demand Diffie-Hellman shared secrets warrant revisiting the traditional communication and censorship circumvention protocols with a new emphasis on ephemeral, extremely short-lived secrets.
Conclusions
Experimental results of basic implementations of the proposed GPU-bound randomness and cryptography functionality suggest that it is suitable for the dissemination of data privacy architectures on low-cost, readily available devices. Autonomy for massively distributed devices in cryptographic quality key generation and applications may provide a partial response to the current post-Snowden situation. Rather than relying on keys built in at distribution time or delivered in bulk by remote servers, personal devices would generate high-quality secret on demand, leveraging the on-board GPU physical randomness pool. The GPU-based platform holds the promise to significantly lower the cost of secret sharing and encryption/decryption directly on personal devices. This in turn may expand usage of privacy systems to personal communications using, for instance, one-time pads, or to manyto-many group communications in dynamic networks.
